In is about directed on or refers

In this essay I will first layout the relational view of intentionality. I will then Present an argument in favour or against that view of intentionality, then present an objection to the position you defend and respond to that objection. The philosophy of Intentionality tries to understand how the mental or mind refers to or about objects. The idea is described by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” For example The sentence ‘dogs are animals’ is about dogs and about animals. Many mental states have ‘aboutness’. This is the ideas that dogs are animals is about dogs. The hatred of dogs or seeing dogs, or wanting a dog. This is The phenomenon of ‘aboutness’ which is called intentionality. Something that is about directed on or refers to an abject is said to ‘have intentionality’, or is stated to be an ‘intentional mental state’.Modern arguments about the foundations of intentionality were started by Franz Brentano in his book, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. He describes it as such.  Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (1995, 88)’intentional inexistence’ is commonly misunderstood. Brentano did not mean that mental states are about particular nonexistent objects, but was about referring to the vague sense in which the object of a mental state is ‘in’ the mind.Intentions, for instance the intention to buy a cat, are just one of many types of intentional mental states.According to Tim Crane’s paper ‘What’s the problem with non existents’ is that some philosophers insist that properly understood intentionality must be a real relation to its objects. So they will deny even that a thinker can represent mythical or fictional objects like pegasus, medusa or Harry Potter. Crane believes in the non-relational view of intentionality but goes on to define the relational view of intentionality as always a relation to existing object and outlines the argument as most of our thoughts are really about the properties of those objects. When the idea of the mythical figure of pegasus is raised it is said that we are thinking about the properties of being a horse, having wings etc and these properties exist and that we unify these properties. When we talk about real objects that do exist such as Barack Obama it is said according to non-relational view that we do succeed in thinking about a particular person and these are very different from non existent ‘things’Thinking of intentionality in this way, as a relation to intentional objects, some problems The first is that the intentional object does not need to exist at any time. The Relational view is argued by Alexius Meinong’s (1904) he does this by using theThe independence principle, Which according to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that “the so-being of an object is not affected by its non-being”, which states an object’s having properties is independent of whether it has being or not. Meinong combines several claims with this principle. Firstly he uses the characterization principle, which claimed that any object has those properties that it is characterized as having (e.g., “The AB is A and B, respectively”)This states that Pegasus is a horse. We know however Pegasus a non- existent horse but The way these objects are according to Meinong is that these objects have ‘Sosein’ this is independent of whether or not they actually have being. This is Meinong’s famous principle of the independence of being (Sein) from being-so (Sosein):And secondly the denial of the ontological assumption, which denies that there are no true propositions about what does not have being (cf. Routley 1980).This view is developed by meinon by the theory of incomplete objects which is the idea that objects are determined in respect to some properties but no others. On Meinong’s view, he is stating that we can make true statements about objects that have non being. Even if a unicorn or pegasus does not exist it can still have horns. Tim Crane however disagrees with Meinong on Intentionality Meinong believes there must be a relation between the thinker and X or Pegasus. Crane however believes in a non relational argument the idea that Thinking about X (Pegasus) does not involve a relation between the thinker and X (Pegasus) Crane outlines this in his the Problems with Meinong in his paper the problem with non existence.    The major problem problem with Meinong is that non-existent things have all the properties they are characterized as having. Crane does not believe in the  ‘characterization postulate’. which claimed that any object has those properties that it is characterized as having (e.g., “The AB is A and B, respectively”) But the principle does not follow from the claim that there are things that do not exist. Crane states that You can accept the latter without accepting the former: you can accept that there was something postulated by Le Verrier without accepting that it is a planet. Non-existent objects do not have all the properties they are represented as having.An example of What is meant when it is said there are truths about non-existent objectsIs Vulcan which was a planet suggested by Le Verrier to explain the the orbit of Mercury. On Meinong’s view, non-existent objects have all the properties they are characterized as having. If we can talk or think about the round square, we can talk or think about something that is round. It is true that the round square is round precisely because we have predicated roundness of it Here, then, are two extreme views about when predictions of things of non- existent objects are true and false. Sainsbury’s view is that no simple prediction is true; Meinong’s view is that such predictions are true when they follow from a characterization of a non-existent object. I reject both views, for the simple reason that there are some ‘simple’ predictions of non-existent objects which are true, and some simple predictions are false. The kinds of true simple predications I have in mind are versions of those mentioned above: This is a problem because of quite general considerations about the fundamental connection between truth and reality, and the idea of something being true of something. For anything—a claim, an assertion, a sentence, a proposition, a thought—to be true is for it to say, in some way or another, how things really are. This idea is embodied in one of the earliest ‘definitions’ of truth in our tradition, Aristotle’s To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1011b25) My conclusion is that the general problem of non-existence derives from the fact that there are truths about non-existent things, but that truth is dependent on being, on reality, on how things really are, or on what exists. This assumes no controversial conception of truth-making, or of being, or of existence. All it assumes is that we can talk and think about non-existent things (objects of thought) and that there can be some truths about them. But if they are true, why are they true? It is not the specific problem of how singular negative existential statements, or propositions, or claims, can be true. For even if one solves that specific problem of the negative existentials, the general problem remains. Moore’s argument recalls Russell’s Principles of Mathematics view that non- existent objects ‘all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them’  In order to talk about X, in order to make some proposition about X, then X must have being of some kind. Let’s call this ‘the Moore/ Russell assumption’. To reject the Moore/Russell assumption we only need to described how a non- referring term, like ‘the round square’ can be intelligible, and thus how we can ‘make propositions’ about it. Crane state that It derives from the simple conflict between the idea that there are truths about non-existent objects, and the idea that truth is dependent on reality and to which I agree for this I reject Meinong’s theory of Relational intentionality.